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CHINA AND THE WEST 
I CHOSE the title "China and the West" because it seemed to be related to Morrison's work. Morrison himself, of course, 
I never met but I did know both his sons. Ian Morrison's ambition 
was to follow his father's career and he had already done a great 
deal to promote understanding between East and West when his 
work was cut short by his death in Korea. 
I propose to start with some criticism of what seems to me a 
confusingly oversimplified account of relations between China 
and the West, namely the chapter entitled "The Far East and 
the West" in Arnold Toynbee's recent book, The World and 
the West. Toynbee describes the contacts between the Far East 
and the West in terms of two encounters. The first in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries in which the Far East first 
started to accept and then decisively rejected elements from 
Western culture and the second in the nineteenth century which 
ended with Far Eastern acceptance of at least Western tech-
nology. He argues that, "In the nineteenth century the Western 
civilization presented itself primarily as a strange technology; in 
the sixteenth century it had presented itself primarily as a strange 
religion." Technology, he believes, was accepted while religion 
was not, partly because the alternative to accepting Western 
technology was a high probability of becoming the colony of 
some Western power, partly because " ... the penetrative power 
of a strand of cultural radiation is in inverse ratio to this 
strand's cultural value." It seemed possible to the leaders of 
Far Eastern countries to accept Western technology without 
accepting anything else. In the long run this belief proved to be 
mistaken and the acceptance of Western technology was fol-
lowed by developments which seemed to be "triumphs for the 
secularized Western civilization of the Late Modem Age." But 
because Western technology had been accepted without Western 
religion the final results were disappointing; "In Japan it bred 
a disastrous militarism; in China it bred a disastrous political 
corruption." And Toynbee's general conclusion seems to be that 
the only hope of satisfactory results from the encounter of 
Western and Far Eastern civilization lies in the line of approach 
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which the Jesuits tried in China when they tried to present West-
ern religion in a form that could be integrated with the Chinese 
cultural tradition. 
All this is one of those theoretical schemes which look very 
nice until one tries to make them fit the facts . It may not be 
entirely fair to Toynbee to judge him on the basis of a popular 
exposition of a topic which will be treated in detail in the 
forthcoming volumes of A Study of History but some of the dis-
crepancies with fact are so glaring that it is hard to see how 
any more detailed version could remove them. One obvious 
defect of Toynbee's scheme is that it lumps China and Japan 
together as instances of Far Eastern civilization. It is certainly 
true that Chinese and Japanese culture have many elements in 
common and for certain purposes it might be reasonable to 
class them together, but their reactions to the West have 
been very different. And it is obvious that Toynbee was think-
ing primarily of Japan. In Japan the first contacts with the 
West did produce a fairly large Christian community which was 
only eliminated after a serious civil war. And the renewed con-
tacts in the nineteenth century did produce a very rapid accept-
ance of Western technology. What is doubtful is whether Japan-
ese militarism could be attributed to the acceptance of "secular 
Western civilization". Japanese militarism certainly used West-
ern technology, but if one looks at the internal struggles in 
Japan in the 192o's and 193o's one finds that the groups respon-
sible for militarism were mainly composed of people who re-
jected "secularized Western civilization" ill favour of a return to 
some purely Far Eastern elements in Japanese culture. The rep-
resentatives of "secularized Western civilization" may not have 
opposed military adventures which seemed likely to bring defi-
nite economic advantages but they were usually a restraining 
influence on the militarist leaders who were violently opposed 
to what they called the "materialist civilization of the West". It 
is interesting that the extreme nationalist and militarist groups 
were critical of the emperor's hobby of marine biology on the 
ground that such scientific interests were contrary to the 
national spirit of Ja pan. They considered that in periods of 
national crisis the emperor should spend his spare time study-
ing Confucian texts. Given their assumptions, this attitude of 
the extreme nationalists was quite logical. Because the emperor 
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was the sort of person who made a hobby of a scientific subject 
he was out of sympathy with the mysticism and mythology 
which the extreme nationalists identified with the "national 
spirit of Japan" and his record was one of consistent, though 
largely ineffective, opposition to militarism. 
For China, Toynbee's scheme does not fit the facts at all. 
The Jesuits obtained their position in Chinese society under the 
late Ming and early Ch'ing emperors, not by offering religion 
but by offering technology. They first made their reputation 
by their obvious superiority in practical astronomy and they 
were valued for their advice about making better types of can-
non, making maps of the Chinese empire, and so on. They were 
acceptable because they combined this offer of technology with 
qualifications as educated men in Chinese culture. Their success 
in spreading religion was comparatively small and they never 
produced anything like the strong Christian community of 
early seventeenth-century Ja pan. As soon as the religious aspects 
of their work became prominent they were eliminated from 
Chinese society leaving almost no permanent impression behind. 
For the nineteenth century it is equally unsatisfactory to lump 
China and Japan together. Some Japanese had retained an interest 
in Western knowledge even when contacts were restricted to the 
small Dutch community and Japan started the large-scale im-
portation of Western technology very soon after the military 
power of the West had compelled the opening of closer con-
tacts. China was never so isolated from Western contacts but 
simply showed no interest in Western knowledge. Lord 
Macartney's mission at the end of the eighteenth century con-
tained a number of technical experts; it was hoped they could 
contribute to the improvement of Sino-British relations, but no 
one was interested in them. Even the knowledge which had 
been brought by the Jesuits seems to have been largely for-
gotten by the mid-nineteenth century. There was no Chinese 
development of the mathematics and science they had intro-
duced and even the factual knowledge of the West had largely 
been lost. Lin Tse-hsii was a high ranking official with special 
responsibilities for dealing with the West. One would have 
expected him to use such knowledge about the West as was 
available in China. But his book on "How to deal with the 
foreign barbarians" devotes whole chapters to speculations about 
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the elementary facts of Western geography which could have 
been settled by a very brief study of the maps prepared by the 
Jesuits. There are discussions of whether the different Chinese 
transliterations for Spain refer to one country or several coun-
tries, whether the Portugese come from Europe or the East 
Indies, and so on. History is equally vague. The Americans are 
thirteen native tribes who revolted against the British. 
Again, Chinese experience of the military strength of the 
West came earlier than the Japanese and was much more severe. 
But it was only after considerable delay that a few of the more 
enterprising Chinese officials developed an interest in Western 
technology and their attitude remained exceptional almost to 
the end of the century. The first railway built by the Japanese 
government was opened in 1 872. In 1875 the Chinese govern-
ment pulled up the tracks of the first railway in China which had 
been built by foreigners without official permission. 
It is also very misleading to ignore the religious elements in 
the nineteenth-century encounter between China and the West. 
Ideas derived from Western missionaries played a part in mak-
ing the T'ai-p'ing rebellion something more than the traditional 
peasant revolt. And the final penetration of Western ideas, and 
even of Western technology, into Chinese society was very 
largely the product of educational work by Christian missions. 
It could be argued that the phase of mission activity which 
started in the nineteenth century would have been more effec-
tive if the missionaries had modelled themselves more on the 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century Jesuits, if they had qualified 
as educated men in the Chinese tradition before trying to pre-
sent their religion to China. But, whatever their shortcomings, 
the work of the missionaries has been a very important factor in 
the development of China during the last century. 
Thus, Toynbee's description of the encounter between West-
ern and Chinese civilizations depends on generalizations which 
simply do not correspond to the facts. The real question which 
any more satisfactory theory must try to answer is, why was 
it so difficult for the traditional Chinese society to take over 
and use Western science and technology? In some cases these 
elements of Western culture seemed to be not the most but the 
least penetrating. The empress dowager, for example, was a 
staunch anti-Westerner but her more private residence just 
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outside Peking was a building in Western style full of bad 
Western art of the type one associates with seaside boarding 
houses in England but on a much more expensive and corres-
pondingly more hideous scale. 
Before discussing this question directly it is worth noting that 
one point of difference between the earlier and later contacts 
between China and the West is that during the earlier contacts 
the influence was by no means one way. Going back far enough, 
there was a period when the flow of technical knowledge was 
from China to Europe even though this was not the result of 
direct contacts. And the establishment of direct contacts pro-
duced a great deal of European interest in China. In the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there was a con-
siderable importation of Chinese art which was widely copied. 
It became fashionable to lay out gardens in the Chinese style 
with Chinese bridges and buildings. Chinese society and Chin-
ese thought, which became known through the reports of the 
Jesuits and their translations of the Chinese classics, were 
studied with interest and influenced such men as Leibniz 
and Voltaire. In the nineteenth century the West had a very 
great influence on China while China had almost no influ-
ence on the West. Even Chinese art, which had been admired 
in the eighteenth century, was despised in the nineteenth. 
A Western writer on China could say, "Painting is rather 
behind sculpture, but neither can be said to have advanced be-
yond rude imitations of nature. Even the best painters have 
no proper idea of perspective or of blending light and shade ... " 
What was it which made European society of the early eigh-
teenth century responsive to elements in Chinese culture, while 
Western society of the nineteenth century was largely unin-
terested in it? 
It is possible to suggest an answer to this question. In the 
thought of many people in eighteenth-century Europe the 
golden age was in the past, under the Roman empire. And 
for people who thought in terms of the Roman empire as an 
ideal, China had the attraction of an obviously successful civili-
zation. Chinese history had nothing like the Dark Ages in 
Europe. There had been periods of confusion and barbarian 
invasion but the general standards of material civilization in 
China had remained at the sort of level which Europe had 
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attained in classical times and was only regaining in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. In contrast to Europe divided 
into small warring states, China, like the Roman empire, 
showed a vast area at peace under one government. The admira-
tion was increased by the fact that the information available 
in Europe tended to idealize conditions in China. The Jesuits 
reported China as it ought to have been according to Con-
fucian theory more than China as it actually was. But even the 
imperfect reality could be admired. Chinese officials under the 
early Ch'ing emperors may have been very imperfect examples 
of the Confucian virtues but they were still providing adminis-
tration which was fairly competent and not too dishonest by 
the European standards of the early eighteenth century. It was 
possible to look on China as a successful example of the bene-
volent despotism which attracted European thinkers of that 
period. 
By the nineteenth century Western society was being trans-
formed by science and technology while Chinese society hacf re-
mained at the eighteenth-century level. Even if the standards of 
Chinese government had not declined, which in fact they did, a 
civilization which had appeared successful to eighteenth-century 
Europe would have appeared backward to nineteenth-century 
Europe. If one is trying to describe the traditional Chinese society 
in a single phrase one could do so by saying that it got stuck at 
the sort of level which Europe reached in the eighteenth century. 
And the comparison goes a little deeper than the purely material 
level. Chinese readers of eighteenth-century European novels 
find the society depicted in them much less different from 
the traditional Chinese pattern than is the modern Western 
world. 
This leads to a variant of the previous question. Why was it 
that China, at one time ahead of the West in technology and 
having the knowledge of Western science available to it in the 
early eighteenth century, failed to develop in the same sort of 
way as the West? A possible explanation can be found in the 
structure of traditional Chinese society. 
One obvious difference between the social structure of imperial 
China and that of eighteenth-century Europe, or nineteenth-
century Japan, was that China belonged to the class of societies 
in which power and wealth depend on position in the apparatus 
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of government rather than on property. This can be illustrated 
by two quotations. The first is from Williams' The Middle 
Kingdom, first published in 1 882. "Notwithstanding the fact 
that Chinese society is so homogeneous when considered as 
distinct from the sovereign, inequalities of many kinds are con-
stantly met with, some growing out of birth or property, others 
out of occupation or merit, but most of them derived from offi-
cial rank."* The second is from Kinglake's Eothen, describing 
travels in the Ottoman empire in the 183o's. "In the Ottoman 
dominions there is scarcely any hereditary influence except that 
belonging to the family of the Sultan; and wealth, too, is a highly 
volatile blessing, not easily transmitted to the descendants of 
the owner. From these causes it results that the people standing 
in the place of nobles and gentry, are official personages ... "* 
Property counted for more in the Chinese than in the Ottoman 
empire but in both, official position was much more important 
than property. 
In the Western world this type of social structure has only 
appeared in recent times, in the totalitarian states. The distinc-
tive feature of the Soviet Union and its satellite states is not 
the absence of a privileged group - indeed privilege is more 
marked than in most democratic societies. It is the complete 
dependence of privilege on position in the apparatus of gov-
ernment. The right-wing totalitarian states in the West never 
went so far in eliminating property rights but even there posi-
tion in the ruling party was becoming steadily more important 
as compared with the ownership of property. 
The traditional Chinese society could be described as one of 
the most successful examples of a totalitarian system, successful 
in terms of ability to survive. In support of this statement that 
imperial China was a totalitarian system I will quote some 
further passages from Williams because he was a nineteenth-
century American who cannot reasonably be suspected of 
starting with an idea of totalitarianism for which he selected 
supporting evidence from his observations of China. He con-
sidered that, "The institutions of China are despotic and defec-
tive, and founded on wrong principles." But he recognized that 
the stability of Chinese society was something which needed 
explanation. "We must indeed look into its structure in 
• My italics. 
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order to discover the causes of this stability, inasmuch as 
here we have neither a standing army to enforce nor the 
machinery of a state religion to compel obedience toward a 
sovereign. A short inspection will show that the leading prin-
ciples by which the present administration preserves its power 
over the people, consist in a system of strict surveillance and 
mutual responsibility among all classes." The passages des-
cribing this system of control could be transplanted unchanged 
into an article on present-day life in a totalitarian state with-
out appearing in any way remarkable except for their old-
fashioned literary style. To give a few selections: - "The 
man who knows it is almost impossible, exsept by entire seclu-
sion, to escape from the company of secret or acknowledged 
emissaries of government, will be cautious of offending the 
laws of the country, knowing, as he must, that though he should 
himself escape, yet his family, his kindred or his neighbours 
will suffer for his offence. . .. The effect of these two causes on 
the mass of the people is to imbue them with a great fear of 
the government, both of its officers and its operations .... This 
mutual surveillance and responsibility, though only partly ex-
tended throughout the multitude, necessarily undermines con-
fidence and infuses universal distrust .... Thus, with a state of 
society at times on the verge of insurrection, this mass of people 
is kept in check by the threefold cord of responsibility, fear, 
and isolation .... " 
A system which relies only on this sort of control will not be 
stable but only meta-stable. If control is ever relaxed the system 
is likely to collapse. And Williams realized that the principles of 
strict surveillance and mutual responsibility "are added to in 
their efficiency ... by a remarkable spirit of loyal pride in their 
own history, and a general system of political education and 
official examinations." In more modern language, the Chinese 
empire was so stable because it had been largely successful in 
realizing one of the objectives of totalitarian society, the uni-
versal acceptance of a single official ideology. 
One can find in official Confucianism something very like the 
Marxist doctrine of the withering away of the state. In support 
of this statement I will give some quotations from Paul Line-
barger's The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, because he is a 
witness who combines close acquaintance with China and strong 
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sympathies for the traditional Chinese culture. Linebarger is 
describing the Confucian system: - "Government, once cheng 
ming has been set in motion, is not a policy making body. There 
is no question of policy, no room for disagreement, no alterna-
tive; What is right is apparent. Politics, in the narrow sense of 
the word, ceases to be a function of government; only adminis-
tration remains. 
"Secondly, government needs only to administer for two pur-
poses. The chief of these is the maintenance of the ideology. 
Once right views are established, no individual is entitled to think 
otherwise. Government must treat the heterodox as malefactors . 
. . . To protect the society actively against discord, the govern-
ment must encourage the utterance of the accepted truth. The 
scholar is thus the highest of all the social classes; it is he who 
maintains agreement and order .... 
"The other function of government in maintaining the ideol-
ogy lies in the necessity of dealing with persons not affected by 
the ideology. Barbarians are especially formidable, since both 
heretics and criminals may be restored to the use of their reason, 
while barbarians may not, so long as they remain barbarians. 
Accordingly, the government is also a defence system .... 
"Government itself ... has no right to do wrong. The truth 
is apparent to everyone, and especially to the scholars. In this 
wise the Chinese governments were at the mercy of their sub-
jects. No divine right shielded them when public opinion con-
demned them. . . . 
"The consequence of these teachings was such that we may 
say, without sacrificing truth to paradox, that the aim of Chin-
ese government was anarchy- not in the sense of disorder, but 
in the sense of an order so just and so complete that it needed 
no governing .... 
"In the old Chinese society control of the individual was so 
much an ideological one, that political control was infinitely 
narrower than in the West. But, in order to effectuate ideological 
control, there must be an organization which will permit pres-
sure to be exercised on the individual in such a compelling man-
ner that the exercise of external coercion becomes unnecessary. 
In a society in which the state has withered away, after an 
enormous expansion in the subject matter of its control, the 
totalitarian state is succeeded by the totalitarian tradition, if, -
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and the qualification is an important one - the indoctrination 
has been so effective that the ideology can maintain itself in the 
minds of men without the continuing coercive power of the state 
to uphold it .... control of the individual will devolve upon those 
persons making up his immediate social environment. ... " 
This is a rather long summarizing of a considerably longer 
exposition. But the similarity it shows between Confucian and 
Communist doctrine is important as evidence for the totalitarian 
side of the old Chinese social system. It also explains the great 
importance of the old imperial examinations. The way to power 
lay in obtaining a position in the government, and the way to 
position in the government was through a classical education 
which produced people fully indoctrinated with the official 
ideology. 
All this gives a satisfactory explanation of the stability of the 
old social system and its ability to re-establish itself even when 
some period of civil war or barbarian invasion had temporarily 
destroyed the ability of the government to exercise effective con-
trol over its subjects. Everyone with sufficient education to pro-
vide leadership or to run the administration was a believer in 
the traditional system and desirous of preserving it. The fact 
that "educated men form the only aristocracy in the land", as 
Williams expressed it, prevented any rival leadership from ap-
pearing, for a talented boy from a poor family always had the 
chance of rising to the highest positions even though the chance 
may have been small. One can see the same influence in West-
ern society. The number of people who rose from unskilled 
worker to millionaire was small even in the periods of most 
rapid capitalist expansion. But so long as people thought in 
terms of this possibility there was little serious dissatisfaction 
with capitalism. 
One reason for the internal weakening of Chinese government 
in the nineteenth century was the spread of the practice of sell-
ing degrees in the imperial examination system. This restricted 
the career open to talent and produced numbers of educated 
men who did not have the chance of a normal official career. In 
spite of this the prestige of Confucian learning among the masses 
was so high that it persisted long after the old system had col-
lapsed. In the early 194o's the Communists tried the experiment 
of what they called "People-managed schools" in which the vil-
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lage council was allowed to choose the curriculum. They found 
it embarrassing that a good many villages wanted to follow the 
old style classical education beginning with the San Tse Ching 
which had little practical value except as the first stage of pre-
paration for the old civil service examinations which had been 
abolished a generation earlier. 
At this point I might deal with some possible objections to 
the description of imperial China as a totalitarian state. It might 
be argued that it was unfair to call the system totalitarian when 
it was obviously much less inhuman than modern totalitarian 
states and when, unlike modern totalitarian systems, it had 
proved itself capable of reaching the very highest levels in some 
fields of art. As against this, if a totalitarian system is defined as 
one in which power depends on status in the apparatus of gov-
ernment and in which the ruling group maintains its power 
by securing the acceptance of a single official ideology, then 
there is a great deal of evidence for classifying imperial China 
as totalitarian. And it is possible to give reasons for the differ-
ences from modern totalitarianism. Though all totalitarian 
systems use an official ideology to maintain the power of the 
ruling group this does not mean that the differences between 
the various official ideologies are unimportant. Confucianism, 
even in the form it developed as an official ideology, was a more 
humanistic system than Marx-Leninism or the theories of 
National Socialism. Also, while Confucianism was the dominant 
force in the old Chinese society, it was not the only force. Gov-
ernment was never efficient enough entirely to eliminate an 
underworld of secret societies and banditry and some of the 
best Chinese literature was connected with this opposition to 
the official system. Even among the ruling group Confucianism 
was usually mixed with elements of Buddhism and mystical, 
anarchistic Taoism. It might be argued that Chinese civilization 
produced great art in spite of and not because of being 
totalitarian. 
It might also be objected that I have said nothing of feudalism 
in the old Chinese society. This omission was deliberate because 
feudalism, in the sense of power based on the ownership of 
land, only existed at the lower levels of Chinese society and 
even then only through the tolerance of the group whose power 
depended on official status. A landlord family might dominate 
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one village or occasionally even one hsien (and there are about 
2,000 hsien in China). But landownership very seldom gave 
power at the provincial level and never at the national level. A 
high proportion of officials came from landlord families and the 
imperial bureaucracy did not try to extend its direct control 
below the hsien level and left local administration in the hands 
of the local gentry. But power based on landownership could 
never. oppose power based on official status. Even at the village 
level the power of landlords depended to a large extent on the 
combination of land ownership with official positions under the 
central bureaucracy or with money lending or merchant enter-
prises. In Japan, where there was something much more like 
European feudalism, it was possible for local nobles to protect 
Christianity in the sixteenth century or to experiment with 
Western technology in the nineteenth century. In China, even 
the largest landowners would not have been able to experiment 
with policies of which the government did not approve. The men 
who started to experiment with Western technology in the 
nineteenth century were not landowners but officials. Feudal 
influence may have increased under the Republic when govern-
ment became disorganised but even then it was not a dominant 
force. 
The explanation of Chinese society in terms of feudalism, is, 
in fact, part of a doctrinaire Marxist scheme. The frankest 
expression of this can be found in a book by Roy who was one 
of the Com.intern advisers in China in the r92o's. He argues that 
there must be feudalism in China because, "Otherwise, the 
monistic principle of Historical Materialism would be dis-
proved, and the Marxian perspective of history, that Com-
munism is the common destiny of the human race, would be 
untenable." 
The totalitarian features of the old Chinese society explain 
its extraordinary stability so long as it was threatened only by 
internal revolt or pressure from less civilized Central Asian 
societies. They can also explain the inability to absorb Western 
science or technology. Any organization tends to become very 
conservative when power depends entirely on official position 
and promotion on the goodwill of superiors in the organization. 
This can be seen in Western organizations just as much as in 
Chinese but in most Western societies conservatism has been 
limited by competition. If new ideas are rejected by one organi-
zation they may be taken up by another, and any organization 
which is too conservative is likely to find itself in difficulties 
within a period normally less than a single lifetime. In a totali-
tarian system ideas which are rejected by the single official 
organization may have no opportunity at all for developing. 
People in the West with a strictly classical education have often 
been quite as unsympathetic to science as the typical Confucian 
scholar official. Gladstone, for example, could see no point at 
all in Faraday's researches which, within Gladstone's own life-
time, were to. produce the electrical industry. If British society 
had been so organized that the only way to large-scale power 
or wealth had been through examinations in writing Latin 
verse, it is extremely unlikely that science or technology would 
have developed in England. And the classically educated British 
ruling class did make very little contribution to their develop-
ment. 
The development of new ideas was made even more difficult 
in China because the social structure depended on the main-
tenance of the official ideology so that any new developments 
were, potentially, a direct threat to the whole regime. There 
had been developments in mathematics and technology in 
China long before there were any contacts with the West. But 
the early Jesuit missionaries found that there was a law for-
bidding the possession of books on mathematics without special 
imperial permission. Even though the law was not strictly en-
forced its existence would have been a serious obstacle to any 
development of a flourishing Chinese school of mathematics. 
Again, many individuals in China were keenly interested in 
the Western scientific knowledge which became available in 
the seventeenth century. If they had been able to form some 
Chinese equivalent of the Royal Society there might have been 
an independent development of science in China. But any such 
association would almost certainly have been condemned by the 
authorities as a threat to the established ideology. 
In China's Destiny, Chiang Kai-shek argues that it was only 
the alien Manchu dynasty which prevented Chinese develop-
ment from keeping pace with the West. And there is some 
element of truth in this. The Manchus were alien invaders who 
realized that their power depended on keeping the support of 
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the Confucian scholar class. This did tend to make them sup-
porters of the most rigid Confucian orthodoxy, just as, at the 
present time, the most doctrinaire Communists are often those 
who feel that they have a bourgeois background to live down. 
It is just possible that, if China had been under a native dynasty 
with a few exceptionally capable emperors, the Confucian 
orthodoxy could have been sufficiently modified to allow an 
integration of the old system with elements of science and 
technology. But it is not more than a remote possibility. The 
alien dynasty was only one of the influences producing an 
extreme conservatism. 
By the nineteenth century the old ruling group had got into 
an almost impossible position. On the one hand they could not 
make any effective resistance to armed pressure from the West 
without taking over and using many Western ideas and tech-
niques. On the other hand it was extremely difficult to take 
over Western ideas or even to make any realistic compromise 
with the West without endangering the whole system on which 
their power depended. I have compared the Confucian scholar-
official to the Westerner with a strictly classical education but 
the Chinese classical education incapacitated people from under-
standing science or technology far more completely than a 
Western classical education. There is an interesting passage in 
Reginald Johnston's Twilight in the Forbidden City in which 
he explains the rapid descent into poverty of the old Manchu 
aristocracy by the fact that their classical education had made 
them incapable of understanding even elementary arithmetic 
so that they were quite unable to prevent their servants from 
swindling them. If imperial China had tried to respond to 
Western pressure in the same way as Japan it would have in-
volved considerable delegation of power to men whose training 
had put them outside the official ideology on whose universal 
acceptance the stability of Chinese society depended. And, in 
fact, the old system only survived for a few decades after serious 
attempts at using Western techniques were started towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. 
The Chinese ruling group reacted as people often do in a 
really difficult situation, by refusing to face realities. In most 
of the conflicts with Western powers in the nineteenth century 
one finds the Chinese authorities trying to force events into the 
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traditional pattern under which the only possible relation of 
foreign powers to the Chinese empire was one in which the for-
eigners acknowledged Chinese superiority. And this attitude 
was maintained even when its only possible result was to pro-
duce even greater humiliation for the Chinese authorities and 
even greater loss of real power. By the end of the century for-
eigners were making practical assertions of superiority quite as 
far-reaching as those which the Chinese authorities claimed in 
theory but were impotent to enforce. Consider Morrison's des-
cription of his trip from Szechuan to Burma in 1894. "On my 
journey I made it a rule, acting advisedly, to refuse to occupy 
any other than the best room in the inn .... So, too, at every 
inn I insisted that the best table should be given me, and, if 
there were already Chinese seated at it, I gravely bowed to them, 
and by a wave of my hand signified that it was my pleasure 
that they should make way for the distinguished stranger .. . 
I am perfectly sure that, by never verging from my position of 
superiority, I gained the respect of the Chinese, and it is largely 
to this I attribute the universal respect and attention shown 
me during the journey. For I was unarmed, entirely dependent 
upon the Chinese, and, for all practical purposes inarticulate. 
As it was, I never had any difficulty whatever." In fairne~s to 
Morrison it is clear that he realized that he was behaving in a 
way that would not have been tolerated in Western countries. 
He concludes his description of one incident on his journey by 
saying, "Imagine a Chinese in a Western country acting with 
the bluster that I did, although in good humour; I wonder 
whether he would have been treated with the courtesy that 
those Chinamen showed to me!" And Morrison's later career 
showed that he was very different from the typical "old China 
hand". 
This aspect of relations between China and the West could 
be used as an illustration of the sort of chain reaction that often 
complicates international relations. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century the attitude of the Chinese ruling group 
made conditions almost intolerable even for those Westerners 
who would have been ready to deal with China on a basis of 
equality and mutual understanding. And the Western powers 
were not prepared to tolerate this situation when they had the 
force to change it. But the Western reaction produced a foreign 
17 
community in China of which some sections made equally 
arrogant claims of superiority and expressed them with much 
worse manners. Naturally the Chinese were not prepared to 
tolerate this situation when they had the force to change it. 
And now one could draw many analogies between the policies 
of the present Peking government and those of the Chinese 
bureaucracy before the Opium War. The problem here is how 
to break a vicious circle for which both parties must share some 
responsibility. It is unfortunate that the "old China hand" men-
tality persisted in some of the higher circles of foreign official-
dom after it had largely disappeared elsewhere in the West. 
The man who was rumoured to be the United Kingdom gov-
ernment's choice for first ambassador to the new Peking gov-
ernment was an official who frequently talked in terms of such 
arrogant racial superiority that even fellow-Westerners found 
it hard to keep their tempers. 
To return to developments in China; it did prove impossible 
to combine elements of Western culture with the old totalitarian 
society and the old system collapsed as soon as a generation of 
Chinese appeared who had been trained in the use of Western 
techniques. The first group to come to power after the failure 
of Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to restore the imperial system were 
the warlords. Among them, Wu P'ei-fu was the only important 
figure with a degree from the old imperial examination system. 
But several had been trained at the Paoting Military Academy 
which had been established under the empire in an attempt to 
produce a foreign style Chinese army. The Kuomintang was 
very much more Westernized. Sun Yat-sen went to school in 
Hawaii and had a medical degree from Hongkong University. 
Chiang Kai-shek had military training in Japan and a great 
many of the Kuomintang leaders were men with degrees from 
Western universities. In the Communist Party the proportion 
of leaders with foreign training was probably no greater than 
in the Kuomintang but the proportion influenced by traditional 
Chinese education was smaller and the Communists went much 
further than the Kuomintang in rejecting the traditional Chin-
ese system in favour of elements borrowed from the West. 
A great deal of recent Chinese history could be explained in 
terms of the generalization that groups with greater training 
in the use of Western techniques have always been able to 
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overthrow groups whose use of Western techniques has been 
inhibited by attachment to the traditional Chinese system. And 
Western techniques of administration have been quite as im-
portant as technology in the narrow sense. The power of West-
ern societies has depended not simply on technology but also 
on the ability to secure efficient working from large scale organi-
zation. And this depends on what Mary Parker Follet called the 
"de-personalization of authority", - on people acting in terms 
of doing what is necessary to promote the objectives of the 
organization rather than in terms of obeying a personal superior. 
In a large organization effective co-operation between the people 
composing it can only be secured by everyone accepting certain 
rules. The rules may be to some extent arbitrary and conventional 
but effective co-ordination between people who have no direct 
personal contacts depends on everyone in the organization 
keeping to the same conventions. All this means that the effi-
cient working of a large scale organization demands a certain 
attitude of mind among the responsible people in it. There must 
be a certain amount of loyalty to the organization as opposed 
to loyalty to individual leaders, and there must be a feeling that 
observance of the rules of the organization is important as a 
matter of principle, - that, even though some particular breach 
of the rules may be unimportant in itself, respect for the rules 
is vital to the efficient working of the organization. 
This attitude of mind represents a very complete break with 
the old Chinese tradition. In the old imperial system there had 
been a very strong loyalty to the system in general and to its 
official ideology and a certain amount of loyalty to the emperor 
and the ruling dynasty. But apart from this the whole emphasis 
had been on personal relations. When personal loyalties or per-
sonal obligations conflicted with impersonal loyalties or observ-
ance of regulations it was expected that personal obligations 
would prevail. And to some extent this was officially recognized. 
The point can be illustrated from one of the early Sino-British 
conflicts. In the mid-eighteenth century Anson brought a British 
warship to Canton in defiance of the Chinese regulations after 
a fight with the forts defending the river. The local officials 
were determined to make him pay the normal harbour dues on 
merchant ships as the only way of being able to excuse their 
failure to prevent his entry when it was reported to Peking. 
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Anson was equally determined not to pay harbour dues which 
were not levied on warships in Europe. The deadlock was broken 
when a serious fire broke out in Canton and the crew of the 
Centurion did valuable work as volunteer firemen. After Anson 
had created a personal obligation for services rendered to the 
city of Canton the local officials were willing to allow a breach 
of the regulations about harbour dues without waiting for this 
action to be approved from Peking. 
So long as this tradition of the priority of personal obliga-
tions remained, large-scale organizations under Chinese manage-
ment tended to be less efficient than those under foreign manage-
ment. For a long time the foreign-run Maritime Customs and 
Post Office were the oustandingly efficient official organizations 
in China. Even in private business the smaller Chinese firms 
were often very efficient but the larger firms were seldom able 
to compete with the large-scale foreign-run business. And this 
lower efficiency could usually be traced to a failure to realize 
the importance of rules or to the superiority of personal to 
impersonal loyalties. Where many Westerners went wrong was 
in ascribing this lower efficiency to some unchangeable factor 
such as racial qualities instead of to a tradition which could 
be changed, and, to a considerable extent, has been changed. 
One very important reason for the Communist victory in 
China was that Communist administration was much more 
efficient than Kuomintang administration. A great deal of 
Kuomintang administration still retained the old traditions of 
personal loyalty and personal authority. Even the people who 
were trying to do a good job tended to think in terms of extend-
ing their personal authority so that they could then order what 
was right rather than in terms of enforcing an impersonal sys-
tem of rules which would ensure that the organization did what 
was right. Some of the leading Kuomintang officials who were 
hopelessly corrupt by Western standards were fairly honest 
men by their own standards. They would go to considerable 
trouble to fulfil the obligations they recognized, to their rela-
tions, to their followers, or even to their fellow provincials. Only 
they were not prepared to subordinate these personal obligations 
to the impersonal obligations of impartially enforcing the law 
or making their organization work efficiently. 
The Communists started with the great advantage of loyalty 
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being to the Party much more than to any individual leaders. 
When the U.S. Army Observers' Section first came to Y enan 
they asked people how they could be sure that General Ch'en 
Yi, far away in Central China, would not try to set up as a local 
warlord. This was the kind of problem which worried the 
Kuomintang authorities and which they took elaborate, and often 
efficiency destroying precautions to deal with. The Communists 
found it hard to understand the question. The answer, of course, 
was that the primary loyalty of Ch'en Yi's officers was to the 
Party and not to him and that if he had tried to set himself 
against the central authority hardly any of his men would have 
followed him. 
One could also see in the war-time Communist organization 
t:he beginnings of the de-personalization of authority as well as 
the de-personalization of loyalty. Some key organizations, such 
as the army supply system, were very efficient even by Western 
standards and this efficiency depended on a strictly enforced 
system of rules and accounting. In less vital organizations the 
old traditions lingered on. People did not consider the observ-
ance of rules to be a matter of principle and would subordinate 
the regulations to such considerations as not causing someone 
to lose face; and the result was lower efficiency. The point at 
which Communist efficiency really does break down is when the 
requirements of functionally rational action come into conflict 
with the Party Line. But this point was not often reached dur-
ing the civil war. 
The question which remains is why Western influences in 
China were successful in their totalitarian and not in their 
democratic form? Here it is possible to suggest a number of 
explanations all of which may be contributing factors. One such 
factor is that the democratic powers in the West have very 
seldom given support to democracy in China. After the 191 1 
revolution the Western powers backed Yuan Shih-k'ai and not 
Sun Yat-sen and the granting of large foreign loans to Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, which he did not have the legal authority to borrow, 
was decisive in enabling him to establish his independence of 
parliamentary control. In the 1 920's, Sun Yat-sen turned to the 
Soviet Union for support only after he had failed to get any 
support from the Western democracies who were more inclined 
to back the warlord regimes. In the I 94o's the Chinese liberals 
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got a lot of verbal praise from the American government but 
never any practical support against their opponents. A possible 
explanation for all this can be found in Western prejudices 
about racial superiority. I remember the one long conversation 
I had with General Hurley in which he said something like 
this: "Do you really believe that China can ever become a great 
power. Just look at these people! How can they ever reach 
equality with us?" And it is a very easy step from this attitude 
of despising the Chinese people to thinking that they must have 
a strong man to rule over them. 
Another factor is that Western democracy never supplied 
any theoretical system which could be applied to Chinese con-
ditions. Western political theory had a lot to say about the work-
ing of democratic institutions and the rule of law in societies 
where there was a tradition of democracy and law enforcement. 
It had almost nothing to say about the problem of how to set 
up a democratic system on the debris of a collapsing totalitarian 
system, or on how to secure the rule of law in a society where 
the way to power lay in the possession of a private army. As a 
result Chinese liberals have often operated in a world of com-
plete unreality. So long as anyone with military power or poli-
tical influence could ignore the law all talk about the rule of 
law in China was meaningless. But a great deal of work was 
put into drawing up constitutions and legal systems which 
would have been excellent if anyone had taken any notice of 
them. 
On this point some of Sun Yat-sen's ideas were basically 
sound. His description of the Chinese people as a "heap of 
sand" is appropriate for a situation in which a totalitarian sys-
tem has collapsed. The totalitarian system was based on the 
enforcement of a single ideology and a deep hostility to all 
organizations outside the official system. Once the single organiz-
ing principle has disappeared nothing is left but the "universal 
distrust" which Williams noted in the old system. In this situa-
tion Sun Yat-sen's concept of "political tutelage" did offer a 
possibility for a satisfactory policy. The empirical evidence is too 
small to give any certainty but what evidence there is indicates 
that effective democratic government has only developed either 
as a result of a long and gradual evolution or else as a result of 
a period of something like "political tutelage", either under a 
colonial power as in the British Commonwealth or under a 
native dictatorship as in Turkey. Sun Yat-sen's plan under which 
elected governments were to start in the hsien, then extend to 
the provinces and finally to the centre would have been some-
thing like the process under which parts of the British Empire 
have developed from colonies to self-governing dominions. A 
realistic democratic theory for China should probably have 
started with accepting some form of "political tutelage" as a 
practical necessity and concentrated on the problem of how to 
make it work. That is, how to ensure that the group which has 
managed to seize power by military force will use this power 
to train the people for democracy and not degenerate into a 
new ruling group which the people are not allowed to control? 
There is probably no system which would absolutely guarantee 
that political tutelage would develop into democracy and not 
degenerate into tyranny, but there are conditions which would 
favour one development rather than the other. In particular 
free discussion and criticism are likely to be a very strong influ-
ence in preventing the ruling group from using its power in ways 
contrary to its proclaimed principles. 
In fact, perhaps because of the absence of a satisfactory demo-
cratic theory, both the Kuomintang and the Communists 
accepted Leninist party organization. This did seem to offer 
the possibility of at least getting something done in a situation 
where the normal Western type of political organization seemed 
to be quite helpless. But the acceptance of Leninist organization 
with its doctrine of "democratic centralism" implied a decisive 
rejection of the philosophical assumptions behind Western 
science. 
This may seem an extreme statement but I think it can be 
justified. The assumption behind Leninist organization and 
democratic centralism is that it is possible to arrive at certain 
knowledge on the basis of the data available at any particular 
time. The knowledge may be incomplete but it is essentially 
correct and liable to correction only in detail. Having arrived 
at the truth the Leninist party then proceeds to act on it with 
complete discipline and unity. Given the assumption of this 
"essentialist" philosophy totalitarian organization is a perfectly 
logical conclusion. If it is assumed that a system of final and 
absolutely certain truths is known, then it is quite logical to 
23 
believe that society should be organized to secure the universal 
acceptance of these truths. The choice between using force and 
using persuasion is purely a matter of expediency. 
But Western science has come from the combination of two 
beliefs; firstly a faith that nature is orderly and that there are 
no definable limits to the extent to which it can be understood 
and controlled by the human mind through the combination 
of experiment and reasoning; secondly, a humility about the 
degree of understanding attainable by any actual human mind. 
A good illustration of this last belief was Newton's famous say-
ing that in his work he had only been like a small boy playing 
with the more curious pebbles and shells on the beach while the 
whole ocean of truth lay undiscovered before him. The best 
short statement I know of the view of science implied by these 
assumptions was given by Professor Herbert Dingle, "We can 
no longer say 'The world is like this' or 'The world is like that'. 
We can only say, 'Our experience up to the present is best rep-
resented by a world of this character; I do not know what model 
will best represent the world of tomorrow, but I do know that 
it will co-ordinate a greater range of experience than that of 
today'." 
On this view of science it is never possible for any group of 
people to say, "Our knowledge is essentially correct and we will 
proceed to act on it without allowing any further discussion or 
criticism." On the contrary it is only by a process of continuous 
criticism and discussion that the knowledge on which any human 
organization acts can be kept as near to the truth as is possible. 
In a great many cases the fallacy behind democratic centralism 
can be seen without bringing in these philosophical complica-
tions. Many policy decisions are taken on the basis of data 
which ordinary common sense would show to be incomplete; 
which means that the decision, which the Leninist party will not 
allow to be criticized, cannot be anything more than the most 
likely hypothesis on the data available when it was made and 
that any new data may make some other hypothesis more likely. 
As against Toynbee's view that China has taken over Western 
technology while rejecting Western religion I would suggest 
that developments could equally well be explained by the 
hypothesis that China has taken over Western technology while 
rejecting Western science. 
It is another serious defect of Toynbee's system that he makes 
no distinction between science and technology, whereas the 
distinction is, in fact, very real. Technology takes the model of 
the world which science has reached at any particular time and 
accepts it without question as the basis for practical applications. 
Science is continually examining its model of the world in the 
light of new experience or further discussion in order to see if it 
needs to be changed or improved to give a better co-ordination 
of experience. To put it crudely, the technologist is a man who 
is quite satisfied with taking a formula from a text book and 
using it for some practical problem. The scientist is a man who 
is always asking questions about the formula; how well it fits 
the facts, whether a different formula might not be more 
accurate or more general, how it fits into a wider system of 
knowledge and so on. 
A totalitarian system like that of imperial China which has 
completely lost touch with contemporary science may find even 
technology disturbing. But in normal circumstances a totali-
tarian regime has nothing to fear from the technologist. The 
man who takes his scientific principles without question from 
one text book will usually take his political principles without 
question from another text book. The scientist who is always 
examining accepted principles to see if they are justified by 
experience or whether they should not be changed or improved 
is a subversive character, except in a democracy which is not 
afraid of free discussion and would be willing to change any 
policy if the results of discussion and investigation indicated 
that some alternative policy would be better. (This is slightly 
over-simplified because, to a considerable extent, the scientific 
outlook can be kept in a watertight compartment. Many men 
who are genuine scientists in their own technical field are com-
pletely uncritical in their acceptance of political or philosophical 
theories. It remains true that any general spread of the scien-
tific outlook is dangerous for any totalitarian system.) 
The West certainly did not present science at all clearly to 
China. If Arnold Toynbee fails to see the distinction between 
science and technology in 1952, Sun Yat-sen or Ch'en Tu-hsiu 
can hardly be blamed for not seeing it thirty years earlier. The 
Chinese decision to accept Leninism in the 192o's is quite under-
standable, but this has meant that both leading parties in China 
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have been totalitarian. Neither has been willing to allow the 
question of whether or not it was acting so as to promote its 
proclaimed objectives to be subject to scientific test by free 
discussion and investigation of the evidence. 
Totalitarianism was less complete under the Kuomintang. In 
theory the Kuomintang claimed to be organized on the principle 
of democratic centralism but in practice it was never a mono-
lithic party and some groups in it were definitely anti-totali-
tarian. But though these groups had considerable influence at 
certain periods they never became dominant against the groups 
which were totalitarian. Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I was not 
taken for what it was, a set of rather hastily prepared lectures 
containing some valuable insights and suggestions but needing 
considerable development and modification. Instead it was made 
into a sacred text which had to be accepted without criticism. 
Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny contains several passages 
denouncing Communism and Western liberalism as equally 
unsuited to China, and its ideal is a return to an improved 
version of the old Confucian system. Ch'en Li-fu was avowedly 
a neo-Confucian and, as Minister of Education, did his best to 
bring the universities under complete Party control. Tai Li, head 
of the main secret police organization, explicitly stated his 
objective of a monolithic state system. The freedom which did 
exist under Kuomintang rule was not so much the result of an 
approval of freedom by the dominant leaders in the Kuomintang 
as of their organization being too disunited and too incompetent 
to suppress freedom effectively. If one is going to have a secret 
police organization at all there is a good deal to be said for pre-
ferring a corrupt and inefficient one, but this hardly provides 
a satisfactory basis for the development of democracy. 
In the Chinese Communist Party one could, at one time, see 
non-totalitarian tendencies. There was a period when the Com-
munists were beginning to think about the sort of questions 
which would be prompted by a scientific outlook, such as, How 
can we tell when the Communist Party does represent the 
masses? As a result they were beginning to arrive at conclusions 
which were highly heretical from the viewpoint of Stalinist 
orthodoxy. If these trends had continued and become dominant 
the result would have been a non-totalitarian form of Com-
munism but, in fact, they practically disappeared after 1946. 
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This is only a partial explanation for the victory of the totali-
tarian form of Western ideas. However, this victory is a fact 
from which we must try to extrapolate if we want to make pre-
dictions. A simple extrapolation of present trends would indi-
cate the gradual emergence of a typical totalitarian society with 
a privileged ruling group maintaining its power by the enforce-
ment of a single official ideology. The regime is likely to remain 
more competent than the old Confucian system or the Kuo-
mintang but the exceptional competence which was so important 
in bringing it to power is likely to decline through a gradual 
expansion of the field in which official orthodoxy comes into 
conflict with the requirements of functionally rational action 
and through the inherent conservatism of a stabilized hier-
archical organization. 
But this simple extrapolation of present trends is not alto-
gether a safe one to make because there are elements of insta-
bility in the situation. One common but, I think, quite erro-
neous, assumption is that the Chinese Communists are doing 
what they intend to do. As against this, I would argue that, 
because they have rejected scientific thinking over a large field 
of action, they have made themselves incapable of acting in a 
way that is likely to produce the results they intend. In the 
future, the typical totalitarian society may become the con-
sciously accepted objective of the ruling group. At present, the 
limited evidence from outside observers indicates that Chinese 
Communism is still much less cynical than Soviet Communism, 
that many leaders retain considerable attachment to altruistic 
objectives. If this is so, the continuance of present trends de-
pends on continued isolation from scientific thinking. If the 
Chinese Communists ever started to check their theories against 
empirical evidence and to ask, What policies actually serve the 
interests of the masses? or, What policies are actually likely to 
promote peace? the result would be a drastic shift in policy 
leading, most probably, to a return to the trend which was just 
beginning in the late 193o's and early 194o's which would lead 
to a system radically different from Stalinist Communism. This 
would imply that China had accepted Western science as well 
as Western technology. 
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THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON LECTURE IN 
ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology was founded by 
Chinese residents in Australia in honour of the late Dr G. E. 
Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour 
for all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valu-
able services to China, and also to stimulate interest in Australia 
in the art, science and literature of the Chinese Republic. The 
foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chin-
ese Consulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of 
Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, bar-
rister, of V--" . r .-. x ~ ~e_nzie, of 
Canber " ire was 
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uncle: 
THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON LECTURE IN 
ETHNOLOGY 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural: Dr W. P. Chen (Consul-General for China in Australia), 
"The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship, and a Review 
of Dr Morrison's Life in China", 10 May 1932. 
Second: W. Ah Ket (Barrister at Law), "Eastern Thought, with 
More Particular Reference to Confucius", 3 May 1933. 
Third: J. S. MacDonald (Director, National Art Gallery, New South 
\Vales), "The History and Development of Chinese Art", 3 May 
1934· 
Fourth: Dr W. P. Chen (Consul-General for China in Australia) 
"The New Culture Movement in China", 10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Dr Wu Lien-tab (Director, National Quarantine Service, 
China), "Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese 
Abroad", 2 September 1936. 
Sixth: Dr Chun-Jien Pac (Consul-General for the Republic of 
China), "China Today: With Special Reference to Higher Edu-
cation", 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A. F. Barker (Prof. Textile Industries, Chiao-Tung Univ., 
Shanghai, China), "The Impact of Western Industrialism on 
China", 17 May 1938. 
Eighth: Prof. S. H. Roberts (Vice-Chancellor of The University of 
Sydney), "The Gifts of the Old China to the New", 5 June 1939. 
Ninth: His Grace the Archbishop of Sydney, Howard Mowll, "West 
China as Seen through the Eyes of the Westerner", 29 May 1940. 
Tenth: Dr W. G. Goddard (President of the China Society of Aus-
tralia), "The Ming Sheng. A Study in Chinese Democracy", 5 
June 1941. 
Eleventh: Prof. D. B. Copland (Vice-Chancellor, The Australian 
ational University), "The Chinese Social Structure", 27 Sep-
tember 1948. 
Twelfth: Prof. J. K. Rideout (Dept. of Oriental Languages, Univ. of 
Sydney), "Politics in Medieval China", 28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C. P. FitzGerald (Visiting Reader in Oriental Studies, 
The Australian National University), "The Revolutionary Tradi-
tion in China", 19 March 1951 . 
Fourteenth: The Rt. Hon. H. V. Evatt (Leader of the Opposition 
in the Commonwealth Parliament), "Some Aspects of Morrison's 
Life and Work", 4 December 1952. 
